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In this paper, I assess the relative merits of two semantic frameworks for 
slurring terms. Each aims to distinguish slurs from their neutral coun-
terparts via their semantics. On one, recently developed by Kent Bach, 
that which differentiates the slurring term from its neutral counterpart 
is encoded as a ‘loaded’ descriptive content. Whereas the neutral coun-
terpart ‘NC’ references a group, the slur has as its content “NC, and 
therefore contemptible”. On the other, a version of hybrid expressivism, 
the semantically encoded aspect of a slurring term that distinguishes it 
from its neutral counterpart is, rather, expressed. A speaker who uses 
the slurring term references the group referenced by the neutral coun-
terpart and, in addition, expresses her contempt for the target. On this 
view, while the speaker’s attitude may be evaluated for appropriateness, 
the expressivist component of slurring terms is truth-conditionally ir-
relevant. The reference to the group, and only the reference to the group, 
contributes to truth conditions. I’ll argue that hybrid expressivism offers 
a more parsimonious analysis of slurs’ projective behavior than loaded 
descriptivism and that its truth conditional semantics is not inferior 
to the possible accounts available for loaded descriptivism. I also meet 
Bach’s important objection that hybrid expressivism cannot account for 
uses of slurring terms in indirect quotation and attitude attributions.
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In this paper, I assess the relative merits of two semantic frameworks 
for slurring terms. Each aims to distinguish slurs from their neutral 
counterparts via their semantics. On one, recently developed by Kent 
Bach (2017), that which differentiates the slurring term from its neu-
tral counterpart is encoded as a ‘loaded’ descriptive content. Whereas 
the neutral counterpart ‘NC’ references a group, the slur has as its 
content “NC, and therefore contemptible”. On the other, a version of hy-
brid expressivism, the semantically encoded aspect of a slurring term 
that distinguishes it from its neutral counterpart is, rather, expressed. 
A speaker who uses the slurring term references the group referenced 
by the neutral counterpart and, in addition, expresses her contempt for 
the target (the group and also possibly a particular individual in the 
group) on account of the target being an NC. On this view, while the 
speaker’s attitude may be evaluated for appropriateness, the expres-
sivist component of slurring terms is truth-conditionally irrelevant. 
The reference to the group, and only the reference to the group, con-
tributes to truth conditions.
Bach offers his account as an improvement on reigning versions of 
semantic descriptivism, and as a competitor to hybrid expressivism, es-
pecially with respect to its ability to explain slurs’ projective behavior. 
Hybrid expressivism offers a parsimonious analysis of slurs’ projective 
behavior. Bach’s account, I’ll argue, is considerably less so.
One striking feature of Bach’s account is that certain sentences 
containing slurs are neither true nor false and are so at least in part 
because of general purely linguistic features of sentences containing 
slurs. If cogent, the account has the resources to deliver the moral-
ly satisfying result that a sentence like “Jews are Kikes” is not true. 
Though Bach champions the result as a key advantage of his theory 
over hybrid expressivism, he does not spell out an overarching truth 
conditional semantics. I attempt to assess his view by constructing pos-
sible truth conditional semantic theories, and conclude that none deliv-
ers satisfying results without being ad hoc.
Finally, I attempt to meet three objections presented by Bach. One 
is that hybrid expressivism mistakenly gives priority to expressions of 
contempt over assertions of contemptability. Another is that it is un-
able to account for certain uses of slurring terms in indirect quotation 
and attitude attributions. The last is that it implausibly entails that all 
slurs and their neutral counterparts are co-extensive.
1. Loaded Descriptivism: Projective Behavior
Bach distinguishes two basic types of slurs, group slurs and person-
al slurs. For him, group slurs break down (roughly) into racial slurs 
(‘chink’, ‘goy’, ‘kike’, ‘nigger’, ‘honkey’), political slurs (‘commie’, ‘Nazi’), 
and religious slurs (‘raghead’, ‘kike’, ‘heathen’) while personal slurs en-
compass a wide range including those based on intelligence (‘retard’, 
‘moron’), character (‘brown-noser’, ‘asshole’), sexuality (‘queer’, ‘faggot’, 
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‘dyke’, ‘slut’, ‘lecher’), substance abuse (‘boozer’, ‘acid freak’), and pro-
fession (‘scab’, ‘pimp’, ‘whore’).1 His semantics applies across the board, 
to all these expressions.
Bach’s novel theory differentiates slurs from their neutral counter-
parts in many ways that mirror that of Hom and May (2013). Like 
them, it differentiates semantically insofar as slurs and their neutral 
counterparts have distinct semantics, by which I mean that they are 
governed by different semantic conventions, different rules of use. It 
differentiates descriptively insofar as the distinguishing semantic fea-
ture of slurs is encoded as descriptive content. Yet Bach’s motivations 
and handling of truth conditions mark important departures.
For Hom and May, ‘kike’ semantically encodes the descriptive con-
tent ought to be the target of negative moral evaluation because of being 
Jewish. Because it is a moral truth that no one ought to be the target of 
negative moral evaluation for being Jewish, on their view ‘kike’ has an 
empty extension. But not just ‘kike’. “Pimp” and even “fucking Nazi”2 
have empty extensions. For them, slurs as a class have null extensions: 
having an empty extension is essential to what makes a slur a slur. In 
fact, one of their underlying motivations or initial uncontested data 
points is that all slurs necessarily have null extensions.
This, Bach rejects, and not just the point about necessity. On his 
view, whether a slurring term has an empty extension depends upon 
moral facts. It depends upon whether anyone is worthy of contempt on 
account of being an NC. For Bach, ‘kike’ includes both ‘the property of 
being Jewish and the property of being contemptible in virtue of being 
Jewish’ (Bach 2017: 6). So it is extensionless, while ‘pimp’ is not.
Bach advocates a distinctive way in which these two properties are 
encoded in slurs. In general, a slur has as its content “NC, hence con-
temptible”. Thus, the meaning of a slur involves a categorizing compo-
nent, equivalent with that of its neutral counterpart, conjoined with an 
additional evaluative component. The novelty in Bach’s theory resides 
in how the semantic ‘conjoining’ operates. It appears to be explicitly 
designed to sidestep the problems created by Hom and May’s handling 
of slurs’ projective behavior.3
For Bach, ‘kike’ in
(1) Jake is a Kike
1 I selected these examples from Bach’s full appendix of slurs, including his 
typology. As Bach notes, many of the expressions have multiple uses and belong 
in more than one category (witness ‘kike’). Even with this qualifi cation, I do not 
endorse Bach’s classifi cation. Many of the expressions he categorizes as slurs, I 
regard as falling into different categories of pejoratives. I am here just adopting his 
typology to illustrate aspects of Loaded Descriptivism.
2 Hom and May’s PEJ operator ensures that ‘fucking Nazi’ counts as a slur. It is 
somewhat unclear if it does for Bach.
3 I will not go into those problems here. I give an abbreviated account of the 
problems in the appendix to Jeshion (2013a), “Embracing Corruption: A Response to 
Hom and May”. Sennet and Copp (2015) offer a comprehensive survey.
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functions in some ways akin to the way that ‘bachelor’ functions, ex-
pressing the conjunctive property of being an unmarried male. Just 
as being a bachelor requires being both a male and being unmarried, 
so too, for Bach, being a Kike requires being both Jewish and being 
contemptible in virtue of being Jewish. (Bach 2017: 6) The extension 
of ‘bachelor’ contains all and only those individuals who are both male 
and unmarried, and thus is true of just those individuals.4 Symmetri-
cally, the extension of ‘kike’ is determined by whether there are indi-
viduals who are Jewish and contemptible by virtue of being Jewish. 
Because there are no such individuals, ‘kike’ has an empty extension. 
There is no one it is true of.
There is, however, a key difference with ‘bachelor’. In
(2) Jake is a bachelor
the two properties of being male and being unmarried that determine 
the term’s extension and the range of what it is true of operate together 
to contribute a single content. Thus, (2) encodes a single proposition, 
one that is essentially semantically equivalent with that expressed by
(3) Jake is an unmarried male.
By contrast, according to Bach, (1) encodes two distinct propositions, 
those expressed by
(4) Jake is Jewish
and
(5) Jake is contemptible in virtue of being Jewish,
which are truth conditionally independent of one another. So while 
‘bachelor’ models the two conditions on being a kike, what determines 
the extension of ‘kike’, and what it is true of, it fails to model the way 
that slurs contribute to propositional contents of sentence.
To expose how slurs do so, Bach appeals to sentences involving non-
restrictive relative clauses like
(6) Buffalo Bill, who was born in Buffalo, was a great showman.
(6) express two propositions, a primary at-issue content, expressed by
(7) Buffalo Bill was a great showman
and a secondary, supplementary content, expressed in the relative 
clause
(8) Buffalo Bill was born in Buffalo.
Importantly, (6) does not encode the single conjunctive proposition
(9) Buffalo Bill was a great showman and was born in Buffalo
that is true if and only if Buffalo Bill was a great showman and born in 
Buffalo. For Bach, this is the situation with slurs, only the two contents 
4 With ‘bachelor’, I am of course oversimplifying: unavailable unmarried men, 
say priests, don’t count as bachelors. Nothing hangs here on the precise descriptive 
content of ‘bachelor’.
 R. Jeshion, Loaded Words and Expressive Words 115
are ‘not given separate linguistic expression’ (Bach, 7). Instead, what’s 
expressed by (4) is primary, while that of (5) is secondary, functioning, 
he says, as a ‘side comment’ that is ‘loaded into the slur’. What differ-
entiates a slurring term from its neutral counterpart is the encoded 
‘loaded’ descriptive content, hence the apt name Loaded Descriptivism.
Bach’s semantic analysis of slurs is truly novel insofar as it posits 
that the meaning of a single term contributes twice, and separately, 
to the truth conditional propositional content of sentences in which it 
occurs. What justifi es positing such semantic structure? Bach advanc-
es two reasons for modeling the contribution of slurs on analogy with 
sentences involving non-restrictive relative clauses. One concerns ac-
counting for the projective behavior of the offensive element in slurs. 
As is well-known, what is ‘offensive’ in slurs projects out from many 
linguistic environments, occurring within the scope of negations and 
modals, and in the antecedents of conditionals in declaratives, as in 
(10) and (11), modeled on examples from Bach. In most instances, this 
‘offensive’ element is speaker-oriented (Potts 2005).
(10) Jake is not a Kike. He only looks like one.
(11) If Jake is a Kike, he’s stingy.
According to Bach, non-restrictive relative clauses exhibit the same 
projective behavior. He offers the following examples,
(12) It is not true that Buffalo Bill, who was born in Buffalo, was 
  a great showman.
(13) If Buffalo Bill, who was born in Buffalo, was a great showman, 
  he was popular.
noting that in (12) and (13), we rightly assume that the speaker as-
serts the secondary content encoded in the relative clause. Presumably, 
Bach would fl esh out the dual contents of (10) and (11) thus, where I 
am representing the secondary speaker-oriented side comment paren-
thetically. 
(14) Jake is not a Jew (Jews being contemptible in virtue of being 
  Jewish). He only looks like one.
(15) If Jake is a Jew (hence contemptible), he is stingy.
Sentences involving slurs in subject rather than predicate position 
would also receive the dual contents. So on loaded descriptivism
(16) Kikes don’t celebrate Easter.
is semantically equivalent to
(17) Jews, who are contemptible on account of being Jewish, don’t 
  celebrate Easter.
According to loaded descriptivism, all declarative sentences with a slur 
in either subject or predicate position will encode both primary and sec-
ondary contents. I will say that such sentences possess a dual proposi-
tion structure.
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An initial diffi culty is that the projective behavior of slurs ranges 
more widely than these dual proposition structure examples reveal. 
What is offensive in slurs projects not only in complex declarative con-
structions but as well in interrogatives, imperatives, and vocatives:
(18) Why were you talking to those Kikes?
(19) Stay away from those Kikes.
(20) Kike!
To maintain a uniform analysis to handle the projective behavior, Bach’s 
account requires introducing a secondary contribution of slurs in addi-
tion to that which they contribute to the encoded non-declarative. Keep-
ing parity with (10) and (11), the slurs in (18)–(20) ought to contribute a 
speaker-asserted side comment of a declarative content along with the 
primary content in the interrogative, imperative, vocative:
(21) Why are you talking to those Jews (who are contemptible in 
  virtue of being Jewish)?
(22) Stay away from those Jews (who are contemptible in virtue of 
  being Jewish).
(23) Jew (hence contemptible)!5
This awkward result highlights the prima facie implausibility of ap-
pealing to a distinct secondary content to explain the projective be-
havior of slurs. After all, the speakers in (18)–(20) do not seem to be 
encoding declarative contents at all.
Another problem is that a sentence like “Kikes are contemptible” 
ought to strike us as tautological or analytic truths. But this is far from 
clear. They do not elicit the “duh, you called them Kikes!” response in 
the way that “Kikes are Jews” does.
Bach’s second reason for appealing to the semantics of non-restric-
tive relative clauses concerns parallels in their discourse denial struc-
ture. Suppose your interlocutor assertively utters (6) and you know 
that while Buffalo Bill was indeed a great showman, he was not born in 
Buffalo. Wishing to register a correction is knotty because a blanket as-
sertion of “that’s not true” would fail doubly: it would naturally be un-
derstood as a rejection of the primary content, which you endorse, and 
would not be understood as a rejection of the secondary content, which 
you deny. Though the sentence encodes two distinct propositions, given 
its syntactic structure, your ‘that’ is naturally construed as referencing 
just its primary content. Now suppose your interlocutor assertively ut-
ters (1), and you know that Jake is Jewish. Wishing to issue a denial 
of the smearing element, “that’s not true” will again fail doubly: it will 
naturally be taken as a denial that Jake is not Jewish, not anything 
5 Notice that the secondary content cannot be within the scope of the question. 
Such a move would misrepresent the bigot’s utterance. One who asks (18) is not 
inquiring why you are talking to those Jews that are contemptible in virtue of being 
Jewish. Someone who asks “Is there a Chink in the kitchen?” is not making the 
bizarre yet seemingly innocent inquiry whether there is in the kitchen anyone who 
is Chinese and contemptible on account of being Chinese.
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else possibly encoded in the slur. To Bach, the striking parallels offers 
strong justifi cation for modeling the semantics of slurs on sentences 
containing non-restrictive relative clauses.
This rationale likewise raises questions. True, bare, blanket denials 
with a simple “no” or “that’s not true” will not isolate the smearing ele-
ment in the slur-utterance, just as they do not with the content of the rel-
ative clause. The reason, though, is because there exists an independent 
descriptive content in both sentences naturally regarded as the default 
object of such denials. It does not support accounting for the smearing el-
ement of the slur with a secondary descriptive content. In fact, pressing 
further on the comparison exposes important disanalogies.
For one, the content in non-restrictive relative clauses are amena-
ble to denial with a more specifi c negation-containing denial, say, “No, 
he was not born in Buffalo” or “Well, no, he was not born in Buffalo”, 
with ‘well’ functioning as an acknowledgement of the truth in the pri-
mary content (7). This is possible because the existence and distinct-
ness of the two contents is represented syntactically and semantically. 
If Bach’s comparison is apt, then, a denial like “Well, no, Jews are not 
contemptible on account of being Jewish” to (1), as well as to (10), (11), 
(14), (15), should immediately strike us as the right sort to issue to the 
smearing element in the slur. But this is far from apparent. Certainly 
the form of the denial suggests that the speaker has simply advanced 
an incorrect belief about Jews, not that they have done something dero-
gating in using the slur. True, Bach could maintain that this isn’t the 
only sort of push-back a recalcitrant hearer would want to issue. The 
speaker would additionally be open to censure for the performative, to 
what he did in using the slur. But if Loaded Descriptivism is correct, 
the “Jews are not contemptable” denial should nevertheless still strike 
us as obviously apt, and it isn’t.6
Another disanalogy concerns the fact that, for sentences contain-
ing slurs, there is no special reason why reference to the group, the 
alleged primary content according to Loaded Descriptivism, is in fact 
primary in the sense of being that which is the subject of discourse, the 
possible subject of dispute. With sentences containing non-restrictive 
relative clauses, the syntactic form itself reveals its primary content as 
primary. Not so for slur-containing sentences, where there is no syn-
tactic representation of the two distinct contents at all. The point and 
its signifi cance emerge when we consider contexts in which the group 
membership is not at all at issue in the sense of being a possible subject 
6 In addressing objections regarding discourse denials, Bach makes a curious 
claim at odds with the loaded descriptivist semantics. He claims that someone who 
uses ‘kike’ in a sentence like (1) does not assert but only presupposes that Jews are 
contemptible on account of being Jewish. (Bach 2017: 14). If the semantics are given 
as Bach initially details them, with ‘kike’ contributing an additional descriptive 
‘side comment’ modeled on the semantics of sentences with non-restrictive relative 
clauses, the speaker must be making an assertion. Presuppositional accounts of 
slurs have a wholly different semantic structure.
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of dispute to the discussants, while the smearing element is. Imagine 
neo-Nazis showing up at a public Jewish parade, saying
(24) The Kikes are marching down Fifth Avenue.
Here, everyone knows—and knows that everyone knows—that those he 
is pointing to are Jews and that they are marching. Only the smearing 
element of the slur is salient. Thus, an utterance of “no” or “that’s not 
true” ought to seem obviously apropos as a direct denial of the alleged 
asserted content that Jews are contemptible in virtue of being Jewish – 
for in this context, it has no competitor-contents. But it does not.
Similarly, “no” or “that’s not true” should seem apt in reply to a 
question like (21) and an imperative like (22). If they contain a side-
comment declarative content, as I argue above loaded descriptivism 
ought to countenance to preserve uniformity in handling the smearing 
element, such denials should seem on target. In fact, they should seem 
especially apt in the absence of competitor declarative contents. But 
they do not. They come off as strange.
2. Loaded Descriptivism: Truth Conditional Semantics
Where does this leave us with respect to the truth value of sentences 
containing slurs? Certainly positing dual proposition structure to slur-
containing declarative sentences will complicate their overall truth-
conditional semantics. Bach regards the ensuing complications as one 
of the theory’s strengths. Indeed, he champions his loaded descriptiv-
ist semantics as providing a novel and attractive illustration why we 
‘shouldn’t have to decide’ on the truth of sentences like (1). Speaking of 
that sentence, Bach writes:
Is this true or false? Is it or is it not the case that Jacob is a Kike? On the 
one hand, you might say, “yes, he is a Kike”, since the word ‘kike’, notwith-
standing its derogatory force, does manage to distinguish Jews from non-
Jews. On the other hand, you might say, “No, though Jewish, he is not a 
Kike” (perhaps because you agree with me that being a Kike requires being 
contemptible for being Jewish). In the recent debate about slurs, some lean 
one way, some the other. In my view, one shouldn’t have to decide – having 
to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a statement made with a sentence like (1) is a forced 
choice that one should resist making.
…according to Loaded Descriptivism, the problem with assessing (1) for 
truth or falsity, and why we resist doing this, is its misleadingly simple 
predicative form. Just recall our non-semantic question...: what’s the differ-
ence, if any, between being a Jew and being a Kike? From the perspective 
of Loaded Descriptivism, this is a misguided question. On the one hand, one 
just has to be a Jew; on the other, being a Kike requires that being Jewish 
inherently involves being contemptible. Since there are actually two sepa-
rate propositions to be considered, it is a mistake to suppose that a sentence 
like (1) has a single truth-value. Like a sentence containing a nonrestric-
tive relative clause but in a compressed way, it expresses two independent 
propositions, not one conjunctive proposition. (Bach 2017: 7–8)
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Bach’s thought appears to be that the reason why a sentence like (1) 
lacks truth value is that it possesses a dual proposition structure. Bach 
concludes that this ‘undercuts’ debates extending from Hom and May’s 
(2013) on the truth values of sentences containing slurs, and even on 
whether slurs like ‘kike’ have a null or non-null extension (Bach 2017: 
7–8).
Things are trickier than they might appear, however. Bach frames 
his ‘forced-choice’ point specifi cally about sentences like (1), yet ad-
vances loaded descriptivism’s semantics to apply generally, to all slur-
containing sentences. What remains unclear, then, is how this im-
pacts loaded descriptivism’s truth-conditional semantics. To evaluate 
the cogency of the theory and plausibility of construing (1) as lacking 
truth-value, we need answers to the following: What is the underlying 
rationale for the ‘forced-choice’ claim about (1)? Do all slur-containing 
sentences fail to have a single truth value, or only those sharing ad-
ditional structure to (1)? What are the truth conditions for all slur-
containing sentences? 7
Bach does not directly address these questions. He says enough, 
however, to steer us toward constructing the most plausible answers. 
My goals here are partly clarifi catory, partly interpretive, and partly 
critical. I’ll fi rst detail the space of options for loaded descriptivism’s 
truth-conditional semantics. I’ll then assess them both interpretively, 
according to their capacity to account for Bach’s professed commit-
ments, and philosophically.
As I see it, based on his remarks above, Bach has the following op-
tions for the truth conditional semantics of loaded descriptivism:
Conjunction Theory: A slur-containing sentence with dual proposi-
tion structure is true if and only if its primary and secondary con-
tents are true. Otherwise it is false.
Total Truth-Value Gap Theory: All slur-containing sentences with 
dual proposition structure are neither true nor false.
Symmetric Truth-Value Gap Theory: Slurs-containing sentences 
with dual proposition structure lack truth value if and only the pri-
mary and secondary contents come apart. Where they are the same, 
the truth value of the sentence is conjunctive.
Primary Dominant Truth-Value Gap Theory: Slur-containing sen-
tences with dual proposition structure lack truth value if and only 
if the primary content is true and the secondary content is false. 
Otherwise the truth value of the sentence is conjunctive.
Let’s illustrate the truth-conditional semantics of each option for four 
sentences having the same syntactic form as (1), with the slurs all oc-
7 Ideally, we also would want an account of how loaded descriptivism’s truth-
conditional semantics impacts non-declaratives like interrogative and imperatives, 
where uniformity requires (I argued), in addition to the question and instruction, a 
secondary assertive content. Do they too have a truth value for their assertive content?
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cupying the same predicate position. Assume that no one is worthy of 
contempt on account of religious affi liation or ethnicity, but that ex-
ploitatively selling the sexual services of women and children makes 
one worthy of contempt. Assume also that Jake is Jewish, Blake is not, 
Jayden exploitatively sells the sexual services of women and children, 
while Brayden does not. Then the truth-values of the individual pri-
mary and secondary contents of each sentence is as given below.
(1) Jake is a Kike.  Primary: T; Secondary: F
(25) Blake is a Kike.   Primary: F; Secondary: F
(26) Jayden is a pimp.    Primary: T; Secondary: T
(27) Brayden is a pimp.      Primary: F; Secondary: T
We can summarize how our candidate theories deliver the truth condi-
tions for each sentence thus:
Conjunction Theory: (26) is true. (1), (25), (27) are false.
Total Truth-Value Gap Theory: (1), (25), (26), (27) are truth-valueless.
Symmetric Truth-Value Gap Theory: (26) is true, (25) is false. (1), 
(27) are truth-valueless.
Primary Dominant Truth-Value Gap Theory: (26) is true. (25), (27) 
are false. (1) is truth-valueless.
Now, which theory best squares with Bach’s claims about loaded de-
scriptivism? Clearly, Bach’s invocation of the ‘forced-choice’ rationale 
on (1) marks a defi nite dismissal of the Conjunction Theory. He will 
reject any theory on which (1) possesses a determinate truth value.
Does this mean he’s committed to the Total Truth-Value Gap The-
ory? There are good reasons to think so. His reference to ‘misleadingly 
simple predictive form’ in the quote above suggests that his rationale 
for saying (1) lacks truth value is simply its dual proposition structure 
alone. The theory has the virtue of being non-ad-hoc, an attractively 
general account of why (1) lacks truth-value. The interpretive prob-
lem is that Bach never explicitly signs onto a Total Truth-Value Gap 
theory. Moreover, he makes striking claims suggesting he rejects it. He 
states outright that loaded descriptivism
does not entail that slurs are true of their targets or that they are not. In 
fact, it correctly allows that some slurs can be, and indeed are, true of their 
targets. For example, an asshole, in virtue of what makes him qualify as 
such, really is contemptible. Calling him an asshole may be rude or crude, 
but you don’t misrepresent him by calling him that…What makes an ass-
hole an asshole makes him contemptible. Nothing makes a Jew a kike, re-
gardless of what anti-Semites may think. Whereas group slurs generally 
misrepresent their targets, many personal slurs often represent their tar-
gets accurately, however rudely. (Bach 2017: 13–14)
Bach is here underscoring that loaded descriptivism, unlike Hom and 
May’s descriptivist semantics, leaves open whether slurs, as slurs, inher-
ently misrepresent their targets or have an empty or nonempty extension.
Bach assures us that the world is populated with assholes. Now, if 
you say to an asshole
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(28) You are an asshole
have you spoken truly? Is (28) true? This he does not explicitly pro-
nounce on. Yet, we’re told, ‘asshole’ has a non-empty extension and is 
sometimes true of its targets. And you have engaged in no misrepre-
sentation in calling an asshole an asshole. It seems highly implausible, 
then, that for Bach (28) should count as truth-valueless. 
To Bach, ‘asshole’ possesses exactly the same semantic structure 
as ‘kike’, a point I’d dispute. But let us bypass this and substitute a 
term that, we agree, is a slur, and has a non-empty extension – ‘pimp’. 
If (28) is true on loaded descriptivism, then, given the assumptions 
sketched above, (26) is too. If we can speak truly in calling an asshole 
an asshole, we can speak truly in calling a pimp a pimp. When primary 
and secondary contents are both true, the whole is true and thus the 
Total Truth Value Gap Theory is ruled out as codifying the truth condi-
tions of Bach’s loaded descriptivism. This demonstrates that the dual 
proposition structure of slurs cannot be Bach’s sole reason for denying 
slur-containing sentences such as (1) a truth value.
I’ve been arguing along an interpretative dimension: that Bach him-
self appears unlikely to accept total truth value gaps given that he al-
lowed that certain slurs like ‘asshole’ and ‘pimp’ have non-empty ex-
tensions, are true of certain individuals, and that sentences containing 
them involve no misrepresentations of such individuals. Now I wish to 
ask, should Bach embrace the Total Truth Value-Gap Theory? Is it a 
viable truth conditional semantics for loaded descriptivism?
The chief problem stems from allowing that slurs have extensions 
and can be true of individuals yet every sentence containing a slur 
lacks truth value. A slur can be true of a person P yet we’re unable to 
express that, truly, by using, as opposed to mentioning, it. While ‘pimp’, 
we suppose, is true of P, one cannot express that, truly, by saying “P 
is a pimp”. A lawyer can speak truly, albeit pedantically, by saying “I 
have evidence to convict this person who ‘pimp’ is true of”, but not by 
saying “I have evidence to convict the pimp”. This, I submit, is not a 
happy consequence.
Let’s turn then to the Symmetric Truth Value Gap Theory. It can 
be seen as resting on a slightly different rationale for denying (1) truth 
value: not dual proposition structure alone but such structure together 
with a confl ict in primary and secondary content truth values. This too 
would be a non-ad hoc rationale, rooted exclusively in features of the 
(posited) semantic structure of slurs. It also has the virtue of account-
ing for Bach’s appeal to a ‘forced false choice’ between a true and false 
sub-content. To evaluate the Symmetric Truth Value Gap Theory’s 
candidacy, consider not just (1) but also sentences like (27) with prima-
ry content false, secondary true. Surely Bach should judge them false. 
If you can speak truly in calling an asshole an asshole you can speak 
falsely in calling a saint an asshole. And so long as (26) counts as true, 
(27) should certainly count as false, not as truth-valueless. ‘Pimp’ has 
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an extension and the speaker of (27) is just mistaken about Brayden’s 
occupation. Is there any reason to say that we are confronting a mis-
begotten forced false choice? There is none. What was said was false 
solely in virtue of the fact that Brayden is not in that business. If this is 
correct, the Symmetric Truth-Value Gap Theory is ruled out, (1)’s truth 
value gap cannot be solely grounded on a confl ict between primary and 
secondary contents’ truth values.
This leaves us with the Primary Dominant Truth-Value Gap Theory 
which offers a conjunctive account of truth conditions for all sentences 
except those like (1) with primary content true, secondary false, which 
are truth-valueless. The philosophical problem with this theory is that 
it appears thoroughly ad hoc. The theory isolates sentences like (1) as 
special, with no underlying rationale for why they, and only they, lack 
truth value. It is also a poor interpretive analysis, failing to cohere with 
Bach’s claim that the ‘forced choice’ in (1) is rooted in general features 
of its dual proposition structure.
Whether loaded descriptivism offers an improved descriptivist anal-
ysis of slurs turns in part on the extent to which it delivers a plausible 
and clearly motivated truth conditional semantics. We’ve considered 
four accounts. The Conjunction Theory, Total Truth Value Gap Theory, 
and Symmetrical Truth Value Gap Theory we’ve ruled out on inter-
pretive grounds. The Conjunction Theory is plainly incompatible with 
Bach’s claim that (1) lacks truth value. The Total Truth Value Gap 
Theory and the Symmetrical Truth Value Gap Theory appears at odds 
with Bach’s commitment to certain slurs having extensions, being true 
of certain individuals. The Total Truth Value Gap Theory is also im-
plausible on philosophical grounds for artifi cially barring slurs from 
encoding truths (or falsehoods) while allowing that some slurs are true 
of individuals. The Primary Dominant Truth Value Gap Theory is ad 
hoc. None looks wholly unproblematic.
Finally, let’s have a look at how the non-conjunctive theories evalu-
ate sentences like:
(29) Jews are Kikes   Primary: True, Secondary: False
(30) Jews are not Kikes.  Primary: False, Secondary: False
(31) Exploiters of women and  
  children’s sex are pimps.  Primary: True, Secondary: True
(32) Exploiters of women and  
  children’s sex are not pimps. Primary: False, Secondary: True
Mirroring the patterning above, the Total Truth Value Gap Theory takes 
all to be truthvalueless. Consequently, (29) is classifi ed alongside (30) 
and (31) in lacking truth value, which is hardly a morally satisfying re-
sult, at least not one that the theory could advertise as an explanatory 
virtue. The Symmetrical Truth Value Gap Theory groups (29) along with 
(32) as truthvalueless, which seems random. The Primary Dominant 
Truth Value Gap Theory offers a more satisfying result, with (29) truth-
valueless, (31) true, (30) and (32) both false, yet, as noted earlier, stands 
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in need of a linguistic justifi cation. On any of these theories, it is diffi -
cult to see how Loaded Descriptivism marks a clear improvement on the 
truth conditional semantics of competitor semantic descriptivist views.
3. Hybrid Expressivism: Projective Behavior 
Hybrid expressivism differentiates between slurs and their neutral 
counterparts by incorporating an independent non-truth conditionally 
relevant semantic component, the expression of contempt toward the 
target group. On my favored view,8 slurs function semantically in the 
same way that their neutral counterparts function when given con-
temptuous intonation and when fronted by expletives or certain nega-
tive adjectives. (1) receives roughly the same semantic analysis as ut-
terances of (33) and (34).9
(33) Jake is a dirty Jew.
(34) Jake is a JewC.
‘Kike’ has a group-referencing component, picking out the same group 
as its neutral counterpart, ‘Jew’. It is this component, and only this 
component, that contributes to determining the truth conditions of sen-
tences it occurs within. (1), (33), and (34) are all truth conditionally 
equivalent to “Jake is a Jew”.
Unsurprisingly, then, ‘kike’ has the same extension as ‘Jew’. Some 
regard this as a fatal fl aw of the theory. But if one recognizes that 
pejoration, especially the distinctive type of pejoration manifested in 
slurs, is also pulled off by intonationally marking the neutral counter-
part with expressions of contempt or attaching contempt-fl agging ad-
jectives like ‘dirty’ to neutral counterparts, the impetus to immediately 
discredit hybrid expressivism drops away. For it is far from clear that 
by marking ‘Jew’ with contempt, one has shifted its referent.
‘Kike’ differs from ‘Jew’ insofar as it semantically encodes speaker-
contempt. The semantics posits an expressive component in the form 
of a rule that ‘kike’ be used to express one’s contempt toward Jews on 
account of being Jewish. Slurs are thereby classifi ed (in part) alongside 
other expressives like ‘yahoo’, whose semantics is also given by a rule 
(very roughly) to use it to express pleasure in a signifi cant event. Thus, 
the expression of contempt should not be assimilated to any kind of 
descriptive meaning, assertion, or presupposition that Jews are con-
temptable on account being Jewish.
8 I have fl eshed out the semantics and pragmatics of my own version of hybrid 
expressivism in Jeshion (2013b), (2016), (2017), (ms). Though the account differs in 
some respects from those developed by others, here I introduce only those features 
common to all. Other expressivists include Kaplan (2005), Saka (2007), Copp (2001), 
Potts (2005), (2007), Gutzman (2013). Richard (2008) offers a broadly expressivist 
analysis yet denies that slurs are truth conditionally equivalent to their neutral 
counterparts.
9 There are some differences in the pragmatic analysis of how they cause offense. 
But I do not take these up here.
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One immediate attractive consequence of hybrid expressivism is 
that it makes sense of the non-tautologousness of “Kikes are contempt-
ible”. This follows from the fact that contempt is encoded as an atti-
tude, not descriptively. True, the speaker both expresses and predi-
cates contempt to Jews. But that doesn’t make its assertive content 
tautological. Compare: “Ouch, that hurts!” is not tautological though 
“Painful things hurt” is.10
Because it fully detaches the group-referencing component from 
the expressive component, hybrid expressivism offers an attractive ac-
count of the projective behavior of slurs. Both (10) and (11)
(10) Jake is not a Kike. He only looks like one.
(11) If Jake is a Kike, he’s stingy.
encode exactly the same expression of contempt which projects out of 
the negation and modal. Loaded descriptivism, we saw, introduces its 
secondary content “Jews being contemptible on account of being Jew-
ish” to handle the projection in these declaratives. It ran into problems, 
however, once we widened the scope of the projection behavior, so that 
uniform treatment implausibly required that an assertion be coupled 
together with questions, commands, calls. Hybrid expressivism offers 
a far more parsimonious treatment, smoothly accounting for (18)–(20)
(18) Why were you talking to those Kikes?
(19) Stay away from those Kikes.
(20) Kike!
by appeal to the expression of contempt, requiring no additional as-
serted content at all.
4. Hybrid Expressivism: Indirect Quotation,
Attitude Attributions, and Truth
Bach advances three main problems for Hybrid Expressivism. The fi rst 
concerns expressivism’s account of the “import of slurs”. He claims it 
gets the order of explanation backwards:
Using a slur expresses contempt….not as a matter of meaning but because 
it imputes contemptibility to members of the target group. Yes, there is a 
big difference between calling someone a Jew and calling them a kike, but 
the difference consists in what is imputed (contemptability) and only de-
rivatively in what (contempt) is thereby expressed. (Bach 2017: 10)
The thought is that expressions of contempt from the act of using a 
slurs are derivative, accounted for by reference to the encoded semantic 
content of being contemptable.
I fi nd this intuitive judgment of explanatory priority perplexing. 
Proponents of loaded descriptivism and hybrid expressivism will large-
10 Expressively encoded content may be reinforced without redundancy “That 
fucking fucker is such a fuck” expresses a heightening of the speaker’s emotional 
state. Cf. Potts (2007).
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ly agree that, typically, in using slurs speakers convey contempt and 
impute contemptability. But I see no way to establish, pre-theoretical-
ly, that contemptability is more primitive than the expression of con-
tempt, or the reverse.
Embedded in this claim about which is more primitive may be a 
concern that hybrid expressivism cannot explain how speakers convey 
contemptability via the expression of their own contempt. The idea 
is that the expression of a mere subjective emotion could not elicit or 
impute the objective assessment of contemptability. Yet this miscon-
strues the nature of contempt. Contempt is an affective attitude, an 
emotive stance, that ranks its objects as lesser persons qua persons, 
relative to interpersonally shared moral norms. Because these norms 
are inescapably binding, by expressing one’s own contempt with a slur, 
one effectively represents the person or group as contemptable.11
The second problem Bach isolates concerns slurs’ behavior in at-
titude attributions. He claims that expressivist theories are unable to 
account for how incorporating slurs into attitude attributions can add 
to their accuracy. I illuminate the alleged trouble by fi rst examining 
instances of indirect quotation and later confront attitude attributions. 
Suppose that Jen said
(1) Jake is a Kike
and I report on what she said with this instance of indirect quotation
(35) Jen said that Jake is a Kike. 
With (35), the slur enables me to convey Jen’s anti-Semitic attitudes 
about Jews and does not entail any such attitudes of my own. There’s 
nothing infelicitous with my following up the report with “I was so dis-
gusted”. According to Bach, because expressivism “predicts that expres-
siveness always scopes out of embedded contexts”, it “is not equipped 
to account for all that is being reported.” (Bach 2017: 11) Expressivism 
appears to get things doubly wrong: because the semantics requires the 
encoding of the speaker’s own contempt, (35) communicates an anti-Se-
mitic attitude to me; and because it does not encode descriptive content 
of being contemptible, the report fails to attribute to Jen the anti-Se-
mitic attitude she communicated with (1). Loaded Descriptivism looks 
far better on this score, for my report semantically encodes only some-
thing about Jen, that she said that Jake is a Jew, hence contemptible.
The argument proves too much. For if this is a good argument 
against a hybrid expressivist theory of slurs, it is a good argument 
against an expressivist semantics for any term at all, including those 
like ‘bloody’, ‘freak’n’, ‘fucking’, and ‘goddamned’ that are widely re-
11 See Mason (2003) for a rich analysis of the structure of contempt, including 
how it is governed by interpersonal moral norms. Cf., also Bell (2013). I offer a 
fuller explanation of why expressions of contempt convey contemptability in Jeshion 
(2017).
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garded as requiring expressivist treatment for their uses as intensifi -
ers.12 Suppose that Jen said
(36) The cats are terrifi ed of that goddamned dog.
Then, by exactly the same argument, when I accurately report what 
Jen said with this instance of indirect quotation,
(37) Jen said that the cats are terrifi ed of that goddamned dog
I am only able to express my own attitudes toward the dogs, nothing 
about Jen’s. But this is implausible. Following up (37) with “But I re-
ally love that dog, I don’t know why she hates it so” is not infelicitous.
Whatever complexities arise from specifying the semantics of bare 
expressives in indirect quotation shouldn’t make us question an ex-
pressivist semantics when these terms occur in unembedded sentences.
I don’t have the space here to offer a full account of the semantic 
contribution of slurring terms in indirect quotation and attitude at-
tributions, but I will say enough to turn back this objection. When ex-
pressives occur in the embedded clause of indirect quotation, as in (35) 
and (37), the sentence alone typically admits both a speaker-oriented 
and an attributee-oriented interpretation. In the former, with the slur 
or the bare expressive, the speaker expresses her own attitudes, in the 
latter the speaker captures the attitudes of the one whose words she 
is reporting. In taking up Bach’s challenge, we have been considering 
interpretations in which the attitudes expressed with ‘kike’ in (35) 
and ‘goddamned’ in (37) are exclusively attributee-oriented. But the 
sentences readily admit speaker-oriented interpretations as well. (35) 
could be felicitously followed up with “But of course that PC-queen Jen 
used ‘Jew’”, (37) with “I have no idea why she continues to love that 
fucking dog.”
For speaker-oriented interpretations, the expressive component of 
slurs’ meaning is governed by the standard rule to use it to express 
one’s contempt. Yet within the indirect report, the group-referencing 
and expressive components diverge in which point of view they capture. 
The group-referencing component of ‘kike’ encodes what the attributee 
said, that Jake is a Jew, and the expressive component enables the 
speaker to express her own contempt toward Jews. The bare expressive 
in (37) functions similarly. For attributee-oriented interpretations, the 
group-referencing and expressive components of the slur align, captur-
ing both what the attributee said and how she said it. Yet precisely 
because expressives standardly encode the attitudes of the speaker, 
indirect reports involving them require that the occurrence of the term 
be treated quotatively, as an instance of mixed quotation, where a part 
of the indirect report is construed quotatively. In (35), the whole slur or 
even just its expressive component can be understood as within quotes. 
12 See Potts (2005), (2007), Gutzman (2013).
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This correctly functions to insulate the speaker from her report being 
taken as an expression of her own attitudes.13
Bach acknowledges the possibility of appealing to mixed quotation 
to explain the occurrences of slurs within indirect quotation. He locates 
the main problem as one involving attitude reports, illustrating the 
phenomena with a locution involving ‘thought’ as the verb in the at-
titude ascription and an ‘according to…’ operator:
(38) Dick thought that Henry was a Kraut and Zbig was a Pollack
(39) According to Dick, Henry was a Kraut and Zbig was a Pollack.
Here, in contrast with our examples of indirect quotation, the sen-
tences themselves much more strongly suggest an attributee-oriented 
interpretation as the default. (39) in particular seems even to resist a 
speaker-oriented interpretation. The slurs encode how Dick thinks of 
Henry and Zbig, not how the speaker does. Hybrid expressivism, Bach 
tells us, is not equipped to account for what is being reported.
But it can. To see why, notice fi rst that the primacy of the attrib-
utee-oriented interpretation is not a general feature of propositional 
attitude ascriptions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Bach did not attempt 
to illustrate the problem with belief ascriptions like
(40) Dick believes that Henry is a Kraut and Zbig is a Pollack
which readily admits a speaker-oriented interpretation, attributing 
to Dick only beliefs that Henry is Jewish, Zbig Polish. Sentences con-
taining other propositional attitude verbs – ‘knows’, for instance—also 
naturally admit speaker-oriented interpretations. The fact that propo-
sitional attitude ascriptions do not generally default to attributee-ori-
ented interpretations is a tip-off that there is something special going 
on in (38) and (39).
What distinguishes (38) and especially (39) is that they bring us 
inside the internal mindset—the point of view—of Dick. They do so in 
a way reminiscent of the devices of free indirect discourse, and I will 
propose treating (38) and (39) in a way that is parasitic on how slurs in 
free indirect discourse operate.
Free indirect discourse is a third-person narrative form in which 
aspects of the perspective, voice, of a character are presented within 
the narration itself. Though it functions to capture the inner life of 
the character in the way that ordinary indirect speech does, it does 
not rely on phrases like ‘he thought’ and ‘she wondered’ to do so. Just 
as indirect quotation can be construed as a linguistic device to encode 
13 There is nothing ad hoc in this account. Mixed quotation is pervasive, a 
phenomenon we need to explain other varieties of indirect reports. Note also that the 
fact that indirect reports involving slurs manifest pervasive, systematic ambiguity 
between speaker- and attributee-oriented contexts is predicted by expressivism. 
Indirect quotations typically aim to preserve the truth-conditionally relevant 
content of what is being reported. Uses of slurs and bare expressives within them 
enable speakers to both insert their own attitudes or, via implicit quotation, more 
accurately convey those of their attributees.
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what someone said without resorting to explicit quotation, free indirect 
discourse can be seen as a narrative device to encode what a character 
thinks and feels without resorting to explicit or implicit ‘quotation’ of 
a thought content. Consider the following straightforward discourse:
Dick was on a mission that demanded extreme caution. He strode into the 
bar and scanned the crowd warily. Immediately, he spotted his next contact, 
Henry, in uniform and hunched over a beer. He is a Kraut!, Dick thought. 
Zbig ambled in moments later, brawny and moustached. Dick watched. 
Zbig’s thick Eastern European accent unnerved the waitress when he 
barked orders for a vodka. And he, Dick thought, is a Pollack.
and its transposition into free indirect discourse:
Dick was on a mission that demanded extreme caution. He strode into the 
bar and scanned the crowd warily. Immediately, he spotted his next con-
tact, Henry, in uniform and hunched over a beer. He was a Kraut! A god-
damn Kraut! Zbig ambled in moments later, brawny and moustached. Dick 
watched. Zbig’s thick Eastern European accent unnerved the waitress when 
he barked orders for a vodka. And he, a Pollack!
Free indirect discourse jettisons the explicit attributions “Dick thought” 
in the ordinary discourse and shifts the tense of the contained clause 
(‘is a Kraut’) to that of the narration (‘was a Kraut!’). Though this leaves 
open the possibility that the relevant passages could be construed as 
part of the narrator’s perspective, the discourse primes the reader to 
presume Dick’s point of view so that we naturally interpret them as if 
we’ve been slipped inside Dick’s mind.
Free indirect discourse has important advantages over indirect quo-
tation. Most pertinent here: it enables the author to use interjections, 
vocatives, swearwords, and exclamations—any expressions that can-
not be used in subordinate clauses—to fl esh out the inner world of the 
character. Our free indirect discourse narrative could continue:
Zbig turned and caught his eye. Dick froze. Uh…Oh god. No. Fuck! 
Fucking fuck!
There is no clear way to otherwise capture so specifi cally our charac-
ter’s mental state and feelings here, as well as that represented by “A 
goddamn Kraut!”, within an ordinary discourse limited to indirect quo-
tation of contents that are grammatical as subordinate clauses.
Return to (39): “According to Dick, Henry was a Kraut and Zbig was 
a Pollack”. I think it is no coincidence that the sentence that most force-
fully demands we interpret it with an attribute-oriented perspective 
effectively includes part narration ‘According to Dick’ and a content 
that is in the same tense as the narration, “Henry was a Kraut”, not 
“Henry is a Kraut”. By evoking the structure of free indirect discourse, 
it encourages us to treat the ‘according to’ operator as a device that 
takes us inside Dick’s stance in just the way we shift from narrator’s 
to character’s stance in free indirect discourse. The narrator of our toy 
story is not encoding her own attitudes of contempt, only Dick’s.
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Exactly how do the slurs and the bare expressives in free indirect 
discourse convey the character’s specifi c mental state? I won’t broach 
this fascinating (and intimidating) topic here. But what’s clear is that 
free indirect discourse forces us to interpret as if we’ve been slid inside 
the character’s mind. Any analysis of Dick’s mental state regarding 
what he infers about Henry has to construe it as a thought-feeling com-
plex. One that treats Dick’s thought about Henry as “He is German, 
and worthy of contempt on account of being German!” seems wooden 
at best.
The last problem Bach advances is that hybrid expressivism entails 
that anyone who is a Jew is a Kike. It does indeed, but this isn’t neces-
sarily a failing of the theory. One can be swept into thinking this conse-
quence is disastrous if one’s not careful about how one frames the ques-
tions. It might appear innocuous to kick off discussion of our semantic 
questions by asking what Bach describes as the non-semantic question, 
“what’s the difference between being a Jew and being a Kike?” In my 
view, this prejudicially misframes the linguistic issues at stake. It is in 
many ways analogous to what has gone wrong when, in investigating 
the semantic differences between
(41) Is he a homosexual?
(42) Is he a goddam homosexual?
(1) Jake is a Jew.
(33) Jake is a dirty Jew.
we kick off discussion by asking the (so-called) non-semantic question 
“what is the difference between being a homosexual and being a god-
damned homosexual, a Jew and dirty Jew?” This isn’t the right kind of 
question to ask.
True, hybrid expressivism entails that Jews are Kikes.14 Certainly, 
we may—should—be uncomfortable with saying so, for making such a 
claim feels like an expression of anti-Semitism. Why else would some-
one say that? Yet we’re engaged here in a specifi cally philosophical 
context, accounting for the linguistic properties of slurs. In this highly 
circumscribed context, it is worth reminding ourselves that though hy-
brid expressivism entails that all Jews are Kikes, that amounts to no 
more than that ‘Jew’ and ‘Kike’ have the same extension. Furthermore, 
comparatively, it hard to fi nd much comfort in loaded descriptivism’s 
determination that “Jews are Kikes” lacks truth value.
14 I offer a full analysis of why a semantics of slurs has this consequence in 
Jeshion (ms).
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